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Inherited wealth creates a second distinguishing characteristic of individuals, in addition to
earning abilities. We incorporate this fact into a model of optimal labor income taxation,
with bequests motivated by joy of giving. We ￿nd that taxes on bequests or on inheritances
allow further redistribution, if in the parent generation initial wealth and earning abilities are
positively related. On the other hand, these taxes distort the bequest decision; thus, the overall
e⁄ect on social welfare is ambiguous. A tax on all expenditures of a generation (a uniform tax
on consumption plus bequests) has the same redistributive e⁄ect as an inheritance tax but does
not distort the bequest decision.
JEL-classi￿cation: H21, H24.
Keywords: optimal taxation, inheritance tax, expenditure tax, intergenerational wealth transfer.I. Introduction
The tax on estates or inheritances has always been a highly controversial issue, particularly
in recent years, when it was abolished in some countries like Sweden and Austria.1 In
the political discussion, opponents consider it morally inappropriate to use the moment
of death as a cause for imposing a tax, and stress its negative economic consequences,
in particular on capital accumulation and on family business. Supporters ￿nd these
consequences exaggerated and claim that a tax on bequests is desirable for redistributive
reasons, contributing to "equality of opportunity".
From the perspective of economic theory the essential issue is to formulate an appro-
priate model, which allows a discussion of how a shift from labor income taxation to a
tax on intergenerational wealth transfers a⁄ects social welfare. In this paper we suggest
an extended optimal-taxation model in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). The starting
point of our analysis is the following: inherited wealth creates a second distinguishing
characteristic of individuals, in addition to earning abilities. The role of taxes on estates
or inheritances cannot be well understood without an explicit consideration of this fact.
Typically former contributions discussing bequest taxation in an optimal-taxation
framework have focused on the speci￿cs of leaving bequests, as compared to other ways
of spending the budget, that is, to the consumption of goods.2 Such an analysis, referring
to a standard result in optimal-taxation theory (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976), leads to the
question of whether preferences are separable between leisure and consumption plus be-
quests ￿then an income tax alone su¢ ces, spending need not be taxed at all ￿or whether
leaving bequests represents a complement or a substitute to enjoying leisure. We argue
in the present paper that this is the inappropriate question, because the Atkinson-Stiglitz
result is derived for a model where individuals only di⁄er in earning abilities. What mat-
ters is not that bequests represent a particular use of the budget, but the fact that they
generate di⁄erences in inherited wealth within a generation.
1But this tax still exists in most OECD countries.
2See Gale and Slemrod (2001, p.33) and Kaplow (2001), as well as Blumkin and Sadka (2003) in the
context of a dynastic model.
1We consider an optimal-taxation model which accounts for these di⁄erences, in addi-
tion to earning abilities, and analyze the welfare e⁄ect of proportional taxes on bequests
or inheritances, as well as of a proportional tax on all expenditures (i.e. on consumption
plus bequests), which can be imposed in addition to an optimal nonlinear income tax.
While we have studied a similar model (Brunner and Pech, forthcoming) with bequests
motivated by pure altruism, we now assume a joy-of-giving motive for leaving bequests.
As is well-known, the altruistic motive leads to the study of dynasties (Barro 1974) where
preferences of parents comprise preferences of all descendant generations. A joy-of-giving
motive constitutes a weaker link between generations; individuals just enjoy bequeathing
some amount, without an explicit reference to their heirs￿welfare position. Empirical
studies ￿nd quite mixed results (for an overview, see Kopczuk and Lupton 2007, Kopczuk
2010) and thus do not allow for a de￿nitive conclusion which of the two bequest motives
dominates the actual decisions. Instead it appears likely that a combination of these
bequest motives (together with strategic and accidental bequests)3 is required to explain
the observed pattern of bequests. Consequently, the investigation of the e⁄ect of taxing
bequests, when the latter are motivated by joy of giving, is important.
To some extent, we ￿nd that the consequences of a tax on bequests or on inheritances
are similar, irrespective of whether an altruistic or a joy-of-giving motive prevails. Both
generate a positive welfare e⁄ect by allowing increased redistribution (compared to an
income tax alone), if initial (inherited) wealth is positively related to earning abilities. In-
deed, this e⁄ect may be the reason why these taxes are frequently considered as increasing
equality of opportunity; it does not occur in a model without di⁄erences in initial wealth.
On the other hand, however, the bequest motive makes a major di⁄erence for the ex-
penditure tax. Generally, taxing the expenditures of an individual of some generation
t is equivalent to taxing her initial wealth, if combined with an optimal nonlinear labor
income tax. With an altruistic motive, this equivalence extends to the distorting e⁄ect
on the previous generation t ￿ 1, whose bequests generate initial wealth of generation t.
But with a joy-of-giving motive, this equivalence does not hold any more; the expenditure
3For a classi￿cation of bequest motives, see e.g. Cremer and Pestieau (2006) or Kopczuk (2010).
2tax does not distort the bequest decision of generation t ￿ 1, because the bequeathing
individuals do not take into account a tax imposed on expenditures of generation t. As a
consequence, the expenditure tax has an unambiguously welfare-increasing e⁄ect, if initial
wealth is positively related with earning abilities.
There exist some papers which pay attention to the fact that inheritances create a
second distinguishing characteristic, in addition to earning abilities. However, to our
knowledge this literature does not provide a uni￿ed framework for an analysis of the role
of bequest taxation within an optimal tax system. Cremer et al. (2001) resume the
discussion of indirect taxes (in addition to an optimal nonlinear income tax), given that
individuals di⁄er in endowments as well as abilities. They assume, however, that inheri-
tances are unobservable and concentrate on the structure of indirect tax rates. Similarly,
Cremer et al. (2003) and Boadway et al. (2000) study the desirability of a tax on capital
income as a surrogate for the taxation of inheritances, which are considered unobservable.
In contrast to these contributions, we study a comprehensive tax system where a
nonlinear tax on labor income can be combined with taxes on inherited wealth and on
expenditures. Therefore, we take all these variables as being observable (only abilities are
unobservable). This is indeed the basis upon which real-world tax systems, including the
tax on bequests, operate. In particular, notwithstanding problems of observability, if we
want to know whether the inheritance tax should be retained or abolished from a welfare-
theoretic point of view, the analysis must be based on the assumption of observable initial
wealth.
In the following Section II we introduce the basic model and discuss the consequences
of bequest taxation, given that initial wealth is exogenous. In Section III we incorporate
the distortion of the bequest decision of the previous generation. Section IV provides
some discussion of the results.
II. The model
We start with the simplest model that allows us to analyze the consequences of bequest
taxation on social welfare, including redistribution. In some period t there exist two
3individuals i = L;H with abilities !Lt < !Ht. Individuals live for one period only.
By supplying labor lit they earn gross income zit = lit!it and net income xit. They
are endowed with initial wealth eit, which is used, together with net income, for own
consumption cit and for leaving bequests bit. For the moment we take initial wealth as
exogenous, it resulted from bequests left by the previous generation, whose behavior will
be studied in the next section. Preferences are identical for the individuals and can be
described by the strictly concave utility function u(cit;bit;lit), which is assumed to be
twice di⁄erentiable with @u=@cit > 0;@u=@bit > 0;@u=@lit < 0: Bequests are assumed to
be a normal good.
In period t+1 there exists a generation of heirs, which again consists of two individuals.
They do not work but live on inheritances ejt+1, which are equal to consumption cjt+1;
j = 1;2. Parents determine how bequests bit are assigned to inheritances ejt+1. In contrast
to the model with altruistic preferences, where transmission necessarily takes place from a
parent to the child within a dynasty, in the present model parents may split their estates
and leave some share to each individual of the next generation. As our results hold for any
such assignment, we need not specify this decision in detail. We just describe it as a linear
rule, ejt+1 = ￿jLtbLt+￿jHtbHt, with ￿jit ￿ 0;
P2
j=1 ￿jit = 1;i = L;H; and write generally
ejt+1(bLt;bHt) or cjt+1(bLt;bHt) to indicate the dependency. Utility out of consumption in
period t + 1 is described by U(cjt+1):
The government imposes a nonlinear tax on labor income in period t. We will analyze
the role of three tax instruments which the government can use in addition, namely a
proportional tax ￿bt on bequests bit, a proportional tax ￿et on initial wealth eit, and a
proportional tax ￿t on total expenditures cit + bit.
Indirect utility of an individual i of generation t is de￿ned for given values of gross




maxfu(cit;bit;zit=!it)j(1 + ￿t)(cit + (1 + ￿bt)bit) ￿ xit + (1 ￿ ￿et)eitg;
where we assume that only one of ￿bt and ￿t exists. The RHS of (1) also gives us the
4demand functions cit and bit with the same arguments as vi
t: In this framework, ￿nding
the optimal nonlinear income tax is equivalent to determining the optimal gross- and
net-income bundles (xLt;zLt) and (xHt;zHt). We assume that the government follows
a utilitarian objective with individual weights fit; fjt+1 and requires tax revenues gt in





























(cit + bit) ￿ gt:
In the objective we have abbreviated
P2
j=1 fjt+1U(cjt+1(bLt;bHt)) by Wt+1(bLt;bHt), and
the coe¢ cient ￿ denotes the social discount rate of the welfare of the future generation.
It can also be interpreted as expressing the degree of double-counting of the bequests in
the social objective, because bequests enter utility of generation t and t + 1 (note that
consumption cjt+1 is ￿nanced by bit).
(4) is the public resource constraint and (3) represents the self-selection constraint,
where we assume that in the optimum only the self-selection constraint for the high-
able individual is binding, so that the corresponding one for the low-able individual
can be neglected. Moreover we assume that the single-crossing condition is ful￿lled:
￿(@vi
t (￿)=@zit)=(@vi
t (￿)=@xit) is larger for type L than for type H, at any admissible
(x;z)-bundle.
As is standard in studies of indirect taxes in a Mirrlees-type model, we assume that the
tax authority cannot identify individuals through information obtained when collecting
the taxes on bequests, initial wealth or expenditures. Otherwise, given a ￿xed relation
between the individuals￿abilities and the levels of these variables, it would be possible for
the government to impose an optimal di⁄erentiated lump-sum tax as a ￿rst-best solution.4
4This assumption is in line with actual behavior of tax authorities. Moreover, one can show that the
following results remain essentially unchanged, if a stochastic instead of a ￿xed relation between abilities
and the levels of bequests, initial wealth and expenditures is assumed, so that identi￿cation is indeed not
5Di⁄erentiation of the optimal value function St(￿bt;￿et;￿t) of (2) - (4) gives us the
e⁄ect of the three indirect taxes (￿ and ￿ denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated
with (3) and (4), respectively):
Proposition 1.










































In the above formulas, the upper index "com" denotes the compensated demand func-
tion, and the symbol [L] indicates mimicking, that is, a situation when the high-able
individual opts for the (xLt;zLt)-bundle designed for the low-able individual. The results
of Proposition 1 are analogous to the corresponding ones for a model with an altruistic
bequest motive, found in Brunner and Pech, forthcoming. The welfare e⁄ects of ￿t and
￿et are unambiguously positive, if the high-able individual is endowed with more initial
wealth than the low able, as the self-selection constraint is binding (positive multiplier),
as is the marginal utility of net income. The interesting point is that both taxes have es-
sentially the same welfare consequences, though the tax ￿et on (exogenous) initial wealth
is lump-sum while the expenditure tax ￿t is, in principle, distorting, because it falls on
total consumption which depends on endogenous labor income. However, it is possible to
possible from these levels (Brunner and Pech 2008).
6adjust the optimal tax on labor income in such a way that the distorting e⁄ect of ￿t is
eliminated. Remarkably, an adjustment of the labor income tax also allows to compensate
for all possibly negative e⁄ects on bequests of generation t, thus on welfare of generation
t + 1; no such e⁄ect occurs in Proposition 1b and 1c.
The positive e⁄ect on welfare comes from a relaxation of the self-selection constraint
induced by an increase of ￿et (or ￿t). The intuition can be explained as follows: assume,
as a ￿rst-step, that after an increase of ￿et by ￿￿et, each individual i is just compensated
through an increase of net labor income xit by ￿￿eteit. If eHt > eLt, the high-able
individual experiences a larger increase of net labor income than the less able which
makes mimicking less attractive and gives slack to the self-selection constraint. As a
consequence, in a second step additional redistribution from the high- to the low-able
individual becomes possible, which increases social welfare.
The welfare e⁄ect is more complex for the tax ￿bt on bequests of generation t. If
eHt > eLt and if preferences are weakly separable between labor and consumption, then
we ￿nd a positive welfare e⁄ect due to increased redistribution, because taxing bequests
in fact is a means of taxing initial wealth to some extent. Note that bequests bHt[L] of
the H-type, when mimicking, are larger than bequest bLt of the L-type, if eHt > eLt,
because bequests are a normal good while weak separability implies that the lower labor
time of the mimicker does not change the spending decision (for given net income). Thus,
the intuition is similar to the one described above: compensating the individuals by
an increase in net income by ￿￿btbHt and ￿￿btbLt, respectively, gives slack to the self-
selection constraint. However, the tax ￿bt creates a distortion of the bequest decision,
which leads to a - negative - own compensated price e⁄ect on bequests and thus a⁄ects
welfare of generation t+1 negatively. Moreover, as the last term in Proposition 1a shows,
a deadweight-loss e⁄ect for generation t occurs, which is zero at ￿bt = 0. Altogether, the
welfare e⁄ect is ambiguous.
Obviously, if initial wealth is the same for both individuals, then the (positive) redis-
tributive e⁄ect disappears for all three taxes. This is the framework of the well-known
Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) result, which tells us that indirect taxes cannot improve social
7welfare, if they are imposed in addition to an optimal nonlinear labor income tax and
individuals di⁄er merely in earning abilities. Our result shows that the role of indirect
taxes can be understood when the framework is extended to include the fact that - as a
consequence of wealth transmission in previous generations - di⁄erences in initial wealth
already exist.
III. The previous generation
Next, we go a step back and consider a previous, third generation t￿1. That is, we take
inheritances eit of generation t no longer as exogenous, but consider explicitly the bequest
decisions of generation t￿1. For simplicity we assume again that the previous generation
consists of two individuals only, who di⁄er in earning abilities !Lt￿1 < !Ht￿1 and are
endowed with initial wealth eLt￿1 and eHt￿1. They earn gross income zit￿1 = !it￿1lit￿1
and use net income xit￿1 together with initial wealth for own consumption cit￿1 and
bequests bit￿1: Preferences are again described by the utility function u(cit￿1;bit￿1;lit￿1).
Bequests of generation t ￿ 1 constitute the inherited wealth of the next generation t;
where we assume as in Section II that each individual of the heir generation t receives
some share of the bequests left by each individual of generation t ￿ 1.
In period t ￿ 1, the government determines optimal nonlinear income taxes for both
periods t ￿ 1 and t. Moreover, it considers proportional taxes ￿et on inheritances and ￿t
on expenditures of generation t, which are assumed to be announced at a time such that
generation t is able to adapt its behavior. In addition, as an alternative to ￿et it considers
a tax ￿bt￿1 on bequests of generation t￿1. We analyze the welfare consequences of these
taxes.
How exactly these taxes in￿ uence the decision of the generation t ￿ 1 depends on the
bequest motive: in our model, bequests are regarded as some form of consumption; it is
the amount left to the heirs, which per se provides utility to the bequeathing individuals.
In contrast to the dynastic model, the welfare positions of the descendants are irrelevant
for the bequest decision of the parents, and hence also taxes a⁄ecting only welfare of the
descendant generation are irrelevant.
8Still, it has to be discussed how a direct tax ￿et, imposed on inherited wealth of
generation t, a⁄ects the previous generation. Taking the bequest-as-consumption model
literally, one might again argue that the anticipation of ￿et does not change anything for
generation t ￿ 1, because individuals simply care for what they leave as (gross) bequests
to their descendants. On the other hand, however, it seems more plausible to model the
bequeathing generation t ￿ 1 as caring for the amount that actually goes to their heirs,
that is, for bequests net of the inheritance tax ￿et. Accordingly, we use bit￿1 as indicating
bequests net of an inheritance tax ￿et; then gross bequests are bit￿1=(1 ￿ ￿et). This is
consistent with our view that individuals also care for net bequests bit￿1 in case of a
bequest tax ￿bt￿1 (here gross bequests are bit￿1(1+￿bt￿1)). Obviously, both taxes impose
the same burden if ￿bt￿1 = ￿et=(1 ￿ ￿et), then ￿bt￿1bit￿1 = ￿et(bit￿1=(1 ￿ ￿et)). Revenues
from the bequest tax ￿bt￿1 (the inheritance tax ￿et) are assumed to increase the public
budget of generation t ￿ 1 (generation t, respectively).








)j cit￿1 + (1 + ￿bt￿1)
bit￿1
1 ￿ ￿et
￿ xit￿1 + eit￿1g;
where we assume throughout that only one of ￿bt￿1 and ￿et actually exists. (5) also
determines demand functions for consumption cit￿1(￿) and net bequests bit￿1(￿). By some
way of sharing, the latter result in net inheritances "it(bLt￿1;bHt￿1) of the next generation
t;i = L;H, such that "Lt+"Ht = bLt￿1+bHt￿1. Indirect utility of individual i of generation






)j(1 + ￿t)(cit + bit) ￿ xit + "itg; (6)
and revenues from the inheritance tax are ￿et("Lt + "Ht)=(1 ￿ ￿et):
The intertemporal maximization problem of the government reads as (with weights
fit￿1 for individuals of generation t ￿ 1; public resource requirements gt￿1, and Wt+1















































(cit + bit) ￿ gt: (11)
We now have two self-selection constraints (whose Lagrangian multipliers are denoted by
￿t￿1;￿t) and two resource constraints (multipliers ￿t￿1;￿t). Note that in this maximiza-
tion problem the government is assumed to have no instrument for transferring resources
across generations (see the remark after Proposition 3).
We start with an analysis of ￿bt￿1 (ignore ￿et and let ￿t be ￿xed) and consider a



















(cit + bit) ￿ gt:







t￿1 (￿) + (1 + ￿)
￿1Wt(bLt￿1;bHt￿1;￿t); (13)
s.t. (8) and (10).
In this formulation, the problem is completely the same as the earlier one (2) - (4) for
period t. Hence we get (let St￿1 denote the optimal value function of (7) - (11)):
10Proposition 2.























Proof. Using Wt (de￿ned in (12)) instead of Wt+1, the proof is completely analogous to
the proof of Proposition 1a with t ￿ 1 instead of t.
As expected, the welfare e⁄ect of a tax ￿bt￿1 on bequests of generation t￿1 is the same
as already found in Proposition 1, now occurring one period earlier. There is a positive
e⁄ect, given that eHt￿1 > eLt￿1 (and weak separability of the preferences), because the
tax allows increased redistribution through a relaxation of the self-selection constraint,
and a negative compensated e⁄ect on bequests available for the future generation, as well
as negative deadweight-loss e⁄ect (as soon as ￿bt￿1 > 0).
It should also be noted that, as a consequence of the speci￿c bequest motive, a tax
￿bt on bequests left by generation t does not a⁄ect the previous generation t￿1, and the
welfare e⁄ect found in Proposition 1 remains valid also in the three-generations model.
As an alternative to the bequest tax ￿bt￿1 we now analyze the welfare e⁄ect of a tax
￿et on inheritances of the following generation, and of an expenditure tax ￿t; in Section
II these two taxes were shown to be completely equivalent in a model with exogenous
inheritances of generation t. We again consider a subproblem of (7) - (11) by de￿ning for




















zit + Tet + ￿t
P
i=L;H
(cit + bit) ￿ gt; (16)
where Tet ￿ ￿et
P
i=L;H "it=(1 ￿ ￿et) are the tax revenues. Using ~ Wt instead of Wt we
11arrive at the same formulation (13), (8), (10) (now without revenues from ￿bt￿1) of the
government￿ s problem. The di⁄erence between Wt and ~ Wt is that while the bequest tax
￿bt￿1 a⁄ects generation t only via its in￿ uence on bequests bit￿1 (but tax revenues go to
generation t￿1), revenues of the inheritance tax ￿et go to generation t (Tet is an argument
of ~ Wt). Otherwise, the similarity to the earlier problem (2) - (4) remains.
Proposition 3.
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Noting the equivalence of the tax burden of ￿et and of an ad-valorem tax on bequests
with rate ￿bt￿1 = ￿et=(1 ￿ ￿et), the derivative with respect to ￿et was replaced by the
derivative with respect to ￿bt￿1. Then it can be seen by comparing Proposition 2 and the
￿rst two lines in Proposition 3a that indeed the welfare e⁄ect of the tax ￿et on inheritances
of generation t is similar to the e⁄ect of ￿bt￿1. The di⁄erence is that the deadweight-loss,
occurring with ￿et > 0 a⁄ects the resources of the descendant generation t negatively,
as revenues go into this generation￿ s budget. The two expressions in the third line of
Proposition 3a represent the negative e⁄ect of ￿et on resources of generation t￿1 and the
positive e⁄ect on resources of generation t. One can show that if the government has an
instrument for shifting resources over generations, we have (1+￿)￿1@ ~ W=@Tet = ￿t￿1 and
12these two e⁄ects outweigh each other.5
As already discussed above, taxes that only a⁄ect welfare of generation t do not
in￿ uence the behavior of the previous generation. Hence, the tax ￿t on expenditures of
generation t has no distorting e⁄ect on the bequest decision of generation t ￿ 1, and it
follows that its welfare e⁄ect is unambiguously positive, the same as found in Proposition
1. Let us also mention that, given the analogous structure of the maximization problems
for generation t ￿ 1 and t, respectively, a tax ￿et￿1 on inheritances of generation t ￿ 1 or
a tax ￿t￿1 on all expenditures of generation t ￿ 1 have the analogous welfare e⁄ects as
described in Proposition 1 for generation t.
We close this section by a short discussion on the optimal tax rates. Assuming that
the introduction of a tax ￿bt￿1 or a tax ￿et has a positive welfare e⁄ect (the formulas in
Propositions 2 and 3a are positive when evaluated at ￿bt￿1 = 0 and ￿et = 0, respectivley),
one can ￿nd a characterization of the optimal tax rates from the condition that the
deadweight loss o⁄sets the welfare e⁄ect.6 For the expenditure tax ￿t no distortion of the
bequest decision occurs, hence there is no balancing e⁄ect in our model. In this case, to
determine an optimal rate would require an extension of the model, e.g. by allowing tax
avoidance (such a model was studied in Brunner et al. 2010).
IV. Discussion
In the present paper we have studied whether a marginal shift from labor taxation to
taxes on the intergenerational transmission of wealth increases social welfare, given that
leaving bequests is motivated by joy of giving. For a tax on bequests, imposed on the
5Obviously, the intuition provided for ￿bt (see the paragraphs following Proposition 1) applies in the
same way for the redistributive e⁄ect of ￿bt￿1 within generation t￿1 . To see the redistributive e⁄ect of
￿et, also within generation t ￿ 1 (though its revenues go to generation t), note that a marginal increase
￿￿et raises tax revenues ￿￿et(bLt￿1 + bHt￿1)=(1 ￿ ￿et). Imagine that beforehand the government shifts
this marginal amount ￿￿et(bLt￿1+bHt￿1)=(1￿￿et) in a lump-sum way from generation t￿1 to generation
t, by reducing resources available for xLt￿1+xHt￿1 and increasing resources available for xLt+xHt. The
corresponding welfare e⁄ect is visible in the third line of a), it is negative for generation t￿1 (multiplier
￿t￿1) and positive for generation t (marginal social welfare weight (1 + ￿)￿1@ ~ W=@Tet). Then we can
think of tax revenues from ￿￿et as remaining within generation t￿1, and exactly the intuition described
earlier for ￿bt explains the redistributive e⁄ect of ￿et.
6Compare the approach to derive the formulas characterizing the optimal tax rates in the model with
an altruistic bequest motive in Brunner and Pech, forthcoming.
13parent generation, and a tax on inheritances, imposed on the heirs (but anticipated by
the parents), we have found that these taxes indeed allow further redistribution, on top
of what can be attained by a labor income tax alone, if in the parent generation initial
wealth of the more-able individual is larger than that of the less-able individual. On
the other hand, these taxes distort the bequest decision; as a consequence, the overall
e⁄ect on social welfare is ambiguous. In contrast to the result found in the model with
altruistic preferences, these two taxes are not completely equivalent, because it matters
which generation receives the tax revenues (unless the government has an instrument for
shifting resources over time).
A major di⁄erence between the two models arises for the expenditure tax. With an
altruistic motive, this tax is completely equivalent to an inheritance tax, both have the
two e⁄ects just described. With a joy-of-giving motive, however, it turns out that the
distorting e⁄ect does not occur with an expenditure tax. To see the reason note that an
inheritance tax on generation t clearly has a distorting e⁄ect on the bequest decisions of
the previous generation t ￿ 1. Now, as we have seen, an expenditure tax on generation
t also taxes - indirectly - inheritances of generation t; it increases social welfare of this
generation by allowing further redistribution, given again that inherited wealth of the
high-able individual is larger than that of the low-able individual. On the other hand,
with a joy-of-giving motive individuals of generation t ￿ 1 only care about the amount
left to their descendants. They do not, by de￿nition, care about taxes imposed on the
expenditures of generation t, even if these expenditures are (partly) ￿nanced out of the
bequests they leave. Therefore no distorting e⁄ect on their bequest decision occurs.
The essential point here is foresight of the individuals. In the altruistic model it is as-
sumed that parents have perfect foresight of all factors in￿ uencing the descendants￿utility
positions, which directly enter the parents￿preferences. Thus also taxes imposed on ex-
penditures of the heirs matter for the parents￿decision. No such foresight is assumed with
the joy-of-giving motive; only factors (like a bequest or inheritance tax) which directly
a⁄ect the bequeathed amount distort the parents￿decision.
Ultimately, which model is closer to reality is an empirical question, but it seems
14to be a quite di¢ cult task to test the extent of foresight over generations. Empirical
studies trying to discriminate between the altruistic and the joy-of-giving motive analyze
whether parents di⁄erentiate bequests according to the recipient child￿ s welfare position,
which clearly is a di⁄erent question than foresight of future taxes.
Our starting point was that in view of the Atkinson-Stiglitz result the role of indirect
taxes can only be understood in a model where - as a consequence of wealth transmission
over prior generations - di⁄erences in initial wealth exist, in addition to di⁄erences in
abilities. Then indirect taxes allow more redistribution than a labor income tax alone,
provided that initial wealth of the more able individual is larger than that of the less able
individual. Indeed, if di⁄erences in initial wealth are neglected, then double-counting of
the bene￿ts of bequests (which increase parent utility and have a positive external e⁄ect
on the heirs) leads to the reverse result that a subsidy of bequests is unambiguously
desirable (see Kaplow 2001, Blumkin and Sadka 2003, Farhi and Werning 2010).7 As
already mentioned, in our model the extent of double-counting is indicated by the social
discount rate ￿. The larger ￿, the lower is the weight of the latter in the social welfare
function, and, as Propositions 1a, 2 and 3a show, the more probable is it that the positive
welfare e⁄ect of the introduction of a bequest or inheritance tax dominates the negative
e⁄ect on the next generation.
Finally, it should be noted that our analysis remains essentially unchanged, if an
arbitrary number of generations is considered. On the one hand it is obvious that with a
joy-of-giving motive, taxes imposed on inheritances of some generation t never in￿ uence
bequest decisions of generations earlier than t ￿ 1. On the other hand, it is always
possible to follow the procedure applied in Section III, that is, to de￿ne a function W
that depends on bequests of some generation and captures their welfare consequences
for all future generations. Thus, the model underlying Propositions 2 and 3 is indeed
so general as to allow studying the welfare e⁄ects of inheritance taxation for arbitrarily
many future generations.
7From the perspective of practical economic policy this is a very surprising conclusion. Our appoach
puts it into perspective by revealing the redistributive potential of bequest taxation, and provides a
theoretical underpinning for the frequently expressed view that bequest taxation enhances "equality of
opportunity".
15V. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
From the Lagrangian to the maximization problem (2) - (4) we derive the ￿rst-order

















































a) Let ￿t = 0: The derivative of the optimal value function St with respect ￿bt is found


































t [L]=@￿bt = ￿bHt[L]@vH
t [L]=@xLt and the Slutsky
relation @bit=@￿bt = @bcom








































Multiplying (A1) by bLt and (A2) by bHt and adding both to (A4) gives us the formula
in Proposition 1a.
b) We set ￿bt = 0. Using @vi
t=@￿et = ￿eit@vi
t=@xit; @vH
t [L]=@￿et = ￿eHt@vH
t [L]=@xLt;




































Multiplying (A1) and (A2) by eLt and eHt; respectively, and substituting into (A5)
gives us the formula of Proposition 1b.



































The individual budget equation can be written as cit + bit = Bit; where Bit ￿ (xit +
(1 ￿ ￿et)eit)=(1 + ￿t): Thus, @cit=@￿t = (@cit=@Bit)(@Bit=@￿t) = ￿(cit + bit)@cit=@xit
(use @Bit=@￿t = ￿(xit + (1 ￿ ￿et)eit)=(1 + ￿t)2 = ￿(cit + bit)=(1 + ￿t) and @cit=@xit =
(@cit=@Bit)=(1 + ￿t)); equivalently @bit=@￿t = ￿(cit + bit)@bit=@xit: Using these rela-
tions, together with @vi
t=@￿t = ￿(cit + bit)@vi
t=@xit and @vH
t [L]=@￿t = ￿(cHt[L] +
bHt[L])@vH




































Multiplying (A1) and (A2) by (cLt+bLt) and (cHt+bHt); respectively, and substituting







(cHt[L] + bHt[L] ￿ cLt ￿ bLt): (A8)
17Inserting the (transformed) budget equations of individual H, when mimicking, and
of individual L, i. e., cHt[L] + bHt[L] = (xLt + (1 ￿ ￿et)eHt)=(1 + ￿t) and cLt + bLt =
(xLt + (1 ￿ ￿et)eLt)=(1 + ￿t) into (A8), we obtain the formula of Proposition 1c.
Proof of Proposition 3
a) We use ~ Wt instead of Wt in (13) - where ~ Wt is de￿ned as the optimum of (14), s.t.
(15) and (16) - and derive the ￿rst-order conditions of the maximization problem
(13), (8) and (10) with respect to xLt￿1;xHt￿1 (note that Tet can be written as Tet =
￿et
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￿ ￿t￿1 = 0:










































We ￿nd from (5) that @vi




t￿1[L]=@xLt￿1: Moreover, we make use of the equivalence ￿bt￿1 =
￿et=(1￿￿et) to derive @bit￿1=@￿et = 1=(1￿￿et)2(@bit￿1=@￿bt￿1); where @bit￿1=@￿bt￿1 =
@bcom
it￿1=@￿bt￿1 ￿ ￿it￿1@bit￿1=@xit￿1 (following from the Slutsky decomposition). Using
these relations to transform (A11), adding (A9) multiplied by bLt￿1=(1 ￿ ￿et)2 and
(A10) multiplied by bHt￿1=(1 ￿ ￿et)2, we obtain the formula in Proposition 3a.
b) All t ￿ 1 variables are independent of ￿t; thus the problem (7) - (11) comes down to
problem (14) - (16) for ￿xed "it = (1￿￿et)eit. Then the proof of Proposition 1c applies.
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